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theostpolitik of the early federal republic presents a puzzle: why did west germany—a country that consistently denounced the brutal eastern policies of the third reich and sought to present itself as a new, peace-loving entity—refuse to normalize its relations with most east european countries until the early 1970s? the existing literature has explained bonn's behavior primarily with reference to foreign policy calculations, such as the need to isolate the gdr and its satellite allies and to avoid granting unilateral concessions to the soviet bloc. although such staatsraison considerations were very significant for the federal republic's policymakers, they do not tell the whole story. movement on eastern policy was also significantly hindered by domestic factors, the most important of which was the influence of the vertriebenenverbände—the pressure organizations purporting to represent the millions of germans expelled from eastern europe in the aftermath of world war ii. the role of these organizations has typically received passing reference in general studies of ostpolitik, but the specialized literature on the topic has remained weak.

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however, in the 1960s, adenauer's hardline policy of "reunification through strength" did not come out effectively. later in the 1960s and early in the 1970s, the neue ostpolitik of brandt successfully eliminated the tension of west germany and its east counterparts greatly. it can be said that apart from the global strategy made by the us for the us-ussr cold war, the west german foreign policies did 2 tremendously to the détente between the two germanies and the soviet union. word count: 265 3 table of contents introduction the research question of this essay is "to what extent did the 1950 - 1975 west german foreign policies contribute to the détente among west germany, east germany and the soviet union after the signing of the basic treaty?" after the fall of the third reich, the border of germany was modified and its territory divided by the occupational forces at the peace conferences, and the result was finalised by the potsdam agreement (ghdi, n.d.). followed by the massive destruction of war on natural, industrial and human resources, the international status of germany was in its lowest moment as well as its economic situation. under such circumstances, the occupational forces established a contemporary government under the leadership of former president of the prussian state council in the weimar period, dr. konrad adenauer. the orthodox scholars, like heidenheimer (1960), tend to believe that the choice of adenauer as the chancellor of the frg was due to his pro-westerner, namely, pro-american attitude. considering his foreign policies towards both the east and the west, the orthodox school of opinion tend to 4 believe that his primary purpose was to ensure security of germany through realpolitik, thus including some hardline approaches towards its eastern neighbours. the revisionists believe that adenauer's foreign policies were a pure westpolitik towards european integration and franco- german reconciliation (large, 1996), rather than a specific reunification plan and the seemingly hardline ostpolitik; moreover, the hallstein doctrine were just actions to show determination to the west. the post-revisionists like irving (2002) states that adenauer's foreign policies aimed to the ultimate of reunification and all other actions, such as his confederalist westpolitik, pragmatic realpolitik, or even his hardline ostpolitik were just steps he believed that was necessary to the reunification. after adenauer's resignation in 1963, the new leaders of the frg began to search for an alternative to adenauer's firm and hardline ostpolitik (stent, 1981). willy brandt, the 4th chancellor of the frg came up with the idea of neue ostpolitik, which followed the general atmosphere of global détente (cordell & wolff, 2005). in 25 years, between 1950 and 1975, the international situation between the two superpowers changed gradually but in great means, as well as the leadership and foreign policies of the frg. from adenauer to brandt, from "reunification through strength" to "two states, one nation", the change in frg foreign policies influenced the relationship between west germany, east germany and the soviet union significantly, considering the strategic position of germany (stent, 1981). this essay will focus on the influence of west german foreign policies on international politics, given the greater situation of containment policy, brinkmanship, flexible response or international détente. the significance of issuing an analysis based on the research question of this essay is that the two germanies, as the direct contact point between the west and east, can be treated as an epitome of the general picture of the cold war. the german problem possesses 5 great significance as it remain unsolved across the cold war, and at the meantime, has important uniqueness, as the search for reunification of a divided country can be very enlightening for geo- political researches and trend following in international politics. 1.0 adenauer's foreign policies in order to determine to what extent the foreign policies of adenauer influenced the development of west german-soviet union détente in the late 1970s, the investigation will analyse the territorial concern, international reconciliation and domestic approaches of adenauer's foreign policies. 1.1 adenauer's general aims being elected as the first west german chancellor in 1949, adenauer had a clear aim in his domestic political actions and foreign diplomatic actions. in adenauer's personal political career, he remained anti-communist and pro- westerner since the weimar period as the president of prussian state council 6 (hahn, 1975); meanwhile as chancellor, he managed to get as much of support from his western allies as possible. in post-revisionist consideration, adenauer's core foreign policies was modelled under three key terms: reunification through strength, the hallstein doctrine and european integration (stent, 1981). in his 14 years of chancellorship, adenauer kept working for the possibility of reunification through his politik der stärke (policy of strength); however, he possessed a traditional revisionist concept, an idea that was hard to be achieved under any circumstances (hahn, 1975). generally, the aims of adenauer's foreign policies were made to achieve reunification under his revisionist condition. 1.2 reunification and the hallstein doctrine pursuing a revisionist goal and aiming at reunification, adenauer initiated several approaches towards the east: direct talk with the soviet union, integration with the western allies, namely, through nato (ghdi, n.d.), and diplomatic containment. adenauer's first step was to set up an antagonist position against the east, namely, the german democratic republic (gdr) by a statement in the basic law, suggesting the sole legitimacy of the frg: "it has also acted on behalf of those germans to whom participation was denied" (ghdi, pp.1, n.d.). such announcement in the basic law was considered to be an action "add reunification as an imperative to the basic 7 law", as such point started series of political claims about the legitimacy of the two german states (tilford, pp.18, 1975). as a member of nato, the frg also participated into nato's europe defence program (ghdi, n.d.). the defence program was specifically favoured by adenauer because it fitted into his idea of reunification through strength, as he realised that the key issue of reunification can only be achieved with the help of washington and with the approval of moscow, so strength of his own nation, the frg was needed, at least for negotiation (tilford, 1975). under the idea of reunification through strength, adenauer actively participated into nato's europe defence program, as part of the front of vorwärtsverteidigung (forward defence) and later modified the concept to a more accurate level, vorneverteidigung (defence close to the border) (krell, 1988). adenauer's active participation into the project showed the determination of west germany to unify the whole german nation and the vorneverteidigung was an element of the "reunification through strength" ideology. however, adenauer's approaches of "reunification through strength" was criticised by some opponents in the frg because his uncompromising approach would only strengthen the division, making the separation permanent (hahn, 1975). despite his "strength approach", adenauer started to seek some international support. first, in 1952, the european defence 8 community treaty was designed to create a mutual defence alliance among the us, great britain and france, along with the frg; nonetheless, the treaty was shelved due to the refusal of the french government (ghdi, n.d.), as by then, the relations between the two nations have not yet been reconciliated and the opposition between the adenauer administration and gaullist french remained tight and tensional (irving, 2002). later in 1957, another attempt was made, known as the berlin declaration. the declaration was made by the us, great britain and france, as the previous occupation force of the frg, to claim the possibility of reunification and condemn the soviet evasion of responsibility of helping german reunification (ghdi, n.d.). the declaration also supported the west germany by reassuring some points that was made in the hallstein doctrine in 1955, because at that time, the division of the two germanies was solid and the allies tend to show their determination to the soviet union about german reunification (hahn, 1975). the ratification of the declaration has a great significance in the foreign policies of adenauer's government since the support gained from the outside world relieved some pressure on adenauer's problematic "reunification through strength" and helped the frg opened a new diplomatic approach towards the east. the third approach of adenauer's government towards the east, the application of hallstein doctrine, was the most important one in the 1950s and early 1960s. in

1955, adenauer visited moscow, established a friendly diplomatic relationship with the ussr, and initiated trade and cooperation between the two states and reached an agreement on the release of german war prisoners in soviet union (ghdi, n.d.). the talk seemed friendly but after returning to bonn, adenauer informed the soviet ambassador that firstly, although the diplomatic relation was established, there would be no recognition of the postwar borders, including the oder-neisse line; secondly, the alleinvertretungsrecht (right of sole representation), selbstbestimmungsrecht (the right to determine the political order you want to live under with) and recht auf heimat (the right of expelled germans to their homeland in eastern europe) will not be given up and the legitimacy of the gdr would not be recognised (hahn, 1975). the information given to the soviet ambassador was later modified by walter hallstein and formed the hallstein doctrine, the core of adenauer's foreign policies since 1955. the hallstein doctrine also emphasised the democratic nature of the frg, thus using the requirement of free election against the east, namely, the gdr. as the application of the doctrine, the adenauer government was quite resolute because it would break its diplomatic relation with any country that recognises the gdr, except the soviet union (tilford, 1975). the west german foreign policies during adenauer's period can be described as a clear reflection of the west foreign policies at that phase of the cold war: containment policy, the reunification goal, under the containment policy, can only be achieved by strength, namely, putting pressure on moscow. the foreign support gained by the frg: the increasing west 10 integration, the direct talk between bonn and moscow and the hallstein doctrine that pointed to isolate the gdr, were clearly a derivative of the containment policy.

### 1.3 franco – german reconciliation despite the success of hallstein doctrine towards the east, adenauer also reached a landmark in the foreign relations toward the west: the franco-german reconciliation. the joint declaration in june 15, 1963, was the first time that a franco-german reconciliation was reached in centuries. this reconciliation had always been a wish of adenauer because early in his weimar period, he proposed a franco-german reconciliation in order to avoid further conflicts (griffith, 1978). the reconciliation also means a great significance of the frg towards the east: the frg now got reconciled with his archenemy on the west and the west integration was established (von dannenberg, 2008). the joint declaration was the last big deal made by adenauer in his 14 years as the chancellor of the frg, and 4 months after the declaration, dr. konrad adenauer resigned from his post. the franco-german reconciliation reached by adenauer not only marked the integration of the west alliance, but also implied the end of an era and the open of a new chapter. the reconciliation was considered by the revisionist historians as the most important achievement of adenauer (large, 1996).

### 1.4 impact of adenauer's foreign policies on west german – eastern european relationship from the post-revisionist point of view, the general aim of adenauer was to reunify germany under 1937 border, and the basic foreign policies were made to achieve such aim. for the first section of his foreign policies, the "reunification through strength", the outcomes were not quite on the side of the frg: the east, namely the ussr and the gdr, considered the frg as a threat, thus deepening the division between the two germanies, while the west offered no support to the frg, making the frg the only one that wanted reunification. however, the orthodox school believed that adenauer's action was justifiable because reunification was never among the top priority as the problem of sovereignty and security (heidenheimer, 1960). as a result, the strength approach towards the east did not reconcile but intensified the tensions but such increasing tension was understandable among different schools of opinions (irving, 2002). the second part of adenauer's foreign policies, the gaining of foreign support came out differently than that of the strength approach: on the west, the integration was forming while on the east, strengthened adenauer's claim of reunification but no practical effects took place. in the revisionist point of view, the relatively peaceful and gradual foreign approach possesses the 12 highest significance because the westpolitik of the frg towards the west was indeed the top concern of adenauer. the third and the most important part of adenauer's foreign policies, the hallstein doctrine, increased the tensions considerably due to its anti-communist nature and its claims against soviet interest. according to post-revisionists like von dannenberg (2008), the hallstein doctrine was crucial for the pursuit for reunification because the hallstein doctrine can be considered as the statement made after the tough response to the soviet notes between 1950 and 1952 (irving, 2002). the persistence presented in the doctrine make the doctrine essential to the process of reunification, although in the short run, the relations was deteriorated. overall, the relationship between west german and the east remained tense under adenauer's foreign policies, but the hallstein doctrine that restricted the direct communication between the west and the east gradually eliminated the tension and forced west germany into a sackgasse (dead-end-street) because adenauer's policies would only be in its full potential when the tensions were at their sharpest. as the tension eased by the long confronting, some premises undermined and forced a change in the situation.

### 13 2.0 brandt and neue ostpolitik after the 14 years of stable régime by adenauer, adenauer's successor, ludwig erhard failed his chancellorship within 3 years due to stagflation. after then, the kiesinger-brandt government of the grand coalition took over the post and during which, new policies towards the east was made as the neue ostpolitik. this investigation will evaluate the significance of neue ostpolitik on the west german détente in the late 1970s.

### 2.1 neue ostpolitik and the treaty of moscow since the 1959 godesberg programme, the spd (social democratic party) successfully changed from a socialist party to a non-marxist party, becoming "the party of the people". since then, the spd started to gain popularity while the cdu/csu (christian democratic union/christian social union) lost some; later, under the lead of brandt and bahr, the grand coalition was established, along with the new concept of neue ostpolitik. the neue 14 ostpolitik offered a much different perspective than that of the past policies. neue ostpolitik proposed a recognition of the status quo that the postwar borders were already fixed and the revisionism of adenauer to claim 1937 german borders were not realistic (tilford, 1975). the ostpolitik was controversial to many people because it completely abandoned the major foreign policies in the past 10 years, the hallstein doctrine. basically, the core of ostpolitik is to seek détente with the east bloc countries. prior to their succession of the chancellorship, in 1963, the young leaders of spd, bahr and brandt expressed their concept of neue ostpolitik. egon bahr, supported the idea of "change through rapprochement", made a speech that the reconciliation between the two germanies need to be achieved gradually and gently because the aim was to let the east get relaxed and lower the wall. he also stressed in his speech that unification was a "process of many steps and stations". at the same time, brandt gave out the concept of "policy of small steps" which is about to achieve a relationship with the ussr that the ussr agreed with and recognisable while maintain german rights that would probably lost to the ussr. "it required time" brandt specifically point out that in order to achieve such goal great patience is needed. (ghdi, n.d.) from the 1966 to 1969 kiesinger's chancellorship, the grand coalition put another new policy into practice, the dual track policy. the dual track policy was a two side policy, one on domestic and one on international propaganda about the idea of reconciliation, accommodation and eventually, détente. the dual track policy was considered as the beginning of universal ostpolitik, a total change in the attitude towards reunification: gradual approach and détente in general. in october 28, 1969, willy brandt made his famous political statement "two states, one nation", in which he emphasised the importance of easing tension and shared responsibilities between the west and the east. in his political statement, brandt states that the whole point of ostpolitik was to make a policy for power equilibrium and safeguarded peace in europe, which would eventually reaching reconciliation between the two sides, achieving détente and accomplishing self-determination (ghdi, n.d.). in the statement, brandt mentioned the historical misunderstanding of state, nation, national identity and national consciousness due to the concept of bismarckian state-nation, thus bringing the dilemma between democracy and unification; however, the ostpolitik successfully solved the problem as the recognition of status quo brought the new concept of "two states, one nation" (ghdi, n.d.). also, the concern of socialist germany and democratic germany was also answered, as the transition of spd led the left wing in west germany rather insignificant. the original intention of ostpolitik was to reach détente and gradually achieve reunification. in 1969 and 1970, when brandt was firmly in power, brandt sent bahr to moscow to launch a talk about reconciliation, trying to achieve an ultimately de facto neutralisation under the collective security system. to achieve such goal of universal détente with a possible german reunification approach, bonn cannot ask for too generous terms from the ussr. later in 1970, at 12th august, one of the most important treaties concerned german territory in the second half of the 20th century was signed in moscow, in which germany renounced all territorial claims east to the oder-neisse line by accepting the inviolability character of postwar border (ghdi, n.d.). bahr, the architects of neue ostpolitik, climaxed the neue ostpolitik as a voluntarily soviet détente and the possibility of german reunification was achieved. however, the relations did not please all, as the soviet had the right to put pressure on west germany and germany lost a large piece of territory compared to the loss of versailles. the achievement can be considered as a trade-off between universal détente and german national loss.

### 2.2 impact of brandt's neue ostpolitik on west german – eastern european relationship the neue ostpolitik contribute positively to the reconciliation between the frg and the east: the ostpolitik helped the frg to reach a general neutralisation of the status quo, ended the severe tension cumulated in 17 adenauer's period. the success and effectiveness of brandt's neue ostpolitik to eliminate tensions and establish détente was, as presented by edemskiy at the conference at the mershon center for international security studies, also a contribution of brezhnev's soviet union due to his eagerness of détente and rapprochement (unger, pp.183, 2006). on the other side, neue ostpolitik not only helped to achieve détente with the east, but also "helped to strengthen western europe's integrity" as marie-pierre rey addressed at the conference (unger, pp.185, 2006). all evidence and opinions presented above can lead to a conclusion that neue ostpolitik did not only contribute positively to the détente among the two germanies and the soviet union, but also functioned as a catalyst to the soviet westpolitik, increasing the process of european integration. when the treaty of moscow was signed, the long-existing tension between the two sides was officially eased, shifting the concentration of the two sides into their domestic politics and economics (von dannenberg, 2008). also, the treaty signified the renouncement of all german claims to the territories east to the oder-neisse line, an action ended possible future conflicts (ghdi, n.d.). generally, the impact of neue ostpolitik was quite positive. unlike what was believed about the likeness between adenauer's ostpolitik to that of the second reich, brandt's neue ostpolitik was considered as a continuity, both representing the idea of peaceful revisionism (unger, pp.184, 2006).

### 18 3.0 the basic treaty and schmidt in 1972, the basic treaty was signed, marked the official détente between the two germanies, as well as between the frg and the east entity. this investigation will evaluate the significance of the basic treaty and the successor of ostpolitik, helmut schmidt.

### 3.1 the basic treaty and schmidt the following basic treaty, also known as the four power berlin accord, in 1972 put the west german-east german relationship forward and partly achieve a goal that brandt and bahr failed to achieve using neue ostpolitik, the mitigation with east berlin, by sharing a common united nation 19 membership. later, the treaty of mutual relation with czechoslovakia was signed, which did not contribute significantly to the european west-east détente but as a cumulative progress to the result of neue ostpolitik. in 1974, helmut schmidt became the chancellor and the speed of neue ostpolitik officially slow down. in 1975, another step was made by bonn, by moving the 120000 ethnic german in poland into west germany in order to articulate the ethnically divided borders because the term agreed in moscow treaty of the inviolability nature of postwar borders. later in the helsinki conference in 1975, this point was again mentioned and confirmed with bonn's official explanation to the slowdown of neue ostpolitik: the "open door" was accomplished and the next step, "fill in" requires time, just as willy brandt had said in 1963 (hahn, 1975). clearly, there are other reasons for the slowdown, such as the personality of schmidt, who was obviously less ambitious, compare to that of brandt, who had been active since the weimar era. another important reason is that moscow had already achieved her most important goal: the permanence of the postwar borders while under such circumstance, other goals were much less important towards west germany (stent, 1981). with both sides began to slow down with the "door open", the successor of brandt did very well in gradual achievements and reaching europe-wide reconciliation.

### 20 the success of brandt's ostpolitik and schmidt's continuation was a perfect parallel to the cold war theme of that phase, détente. with the signing of the treaty of moscow and later the basic treaty (ghdi, n.d.), the relationship between the frg and the east remained peaceful and relatively friendly. in 1990, the final reunification of the two germanies marked the end of cold war in germany and the official end of the continuous ostpolitik, which contribute significantly to the peaceful solution of german problem (von dannenberg, 2008).

### conclusion 21 considering the question of "to what extent did the 1955-1975 west german foreign policies contribute to the détente of west germany, east germany and the soviet union after the signing of the basic treaty", the answer can be certain. the west german foreign policies did contribute greatly to the détente of west germany to the east bloc countries and it can be examined by principles and concepts of various schools. firstly, for the orthodox school, adenauer's foreign policies towards its western allies provided germany a strong back, therefore offering german opportunity to develop its own ostpolitik, whether with strength or later, in brandt's time, with negotiation. adenauer's realpolitik with the hallstein doctrine did nothing positive to the following general détente, but his westpolitik provided a strong groundwork for putting brandt's neue ostpolitik into practice. so generally, the orthodox school believes that west german foreign policies in different era contribute differently to the détente in different extents. secondly, for the revisionist school, given adenauer's concentration was not on the east side, so the argument that his foreign policies contribute to the general détente cannot be supported. under such circumstance, without the consideration of adenauer's foreign policies and the hallstein doctrine, the west german foreign policies in brandt's era did contribute to the détente, but mostly, the détente among west germany, 22 east germany and the soviet union was just an application of the us-ussr global détente. finally, for the school of balance of power, the détente was a concession made by both west germany and the soviet union, in which brandt and brezhnev both took a step down to what adenauer and khrushchev (stalin in the early stage presumably) were aiming at. the realpolitik of adenauer and the neue ostpolitik of brandt both contribute to the gradual understanding between the frg and the soviet union, thus all contribute to some extent, to the full-scale détente after 1975. overall, considering all hypothesis and analysis, the foreign policies of frg contribute significantly to the détente among west germany, east germany and the soviet union.

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download free pdfdownload free pdfthe politics of historical memory in germany: brandt's ostpolitik, the german-polish history textbook commission, and conservative reactionjournal of educational media, memory, and society, 2010yangmo kudownloadaddownload pdfdownload full pdf packagegetthis papera short summary of this paper37 full pdfs related to this paperread paperdownloaddownload pdfdownload full pdf packagetranslate pdf the politics of historical memory in germany: brandt's ostpolitik, the german-polish history textbook commission, and conservative reaction1 yangmo ku ph.d. candidate in political science at george washington university abstract • prior to the late 1960s, german history textbooks lacked coverage of po- land and depicted germany's eastern neighbor with negative images. the 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed positive changes to the contents of german school textbooks—particularly with respect to their descriptions of poland and german- polish relations. how and why did germany promote a more reflective view of his- tory and correct negative descriptions of the poles in german history textbooks between the 1970s and 1980s? this article addresses this question by focusing on the influence of brandt's ostpolitik and on the activities of the german-polish his- tory textbook commission. the article also shows how contemporary conservative reaction was not powerful enough to reverse these positive changes to german history textbooks. keywords • brandt's ostpolitik, common recommendations, conservative reaction, german history textbooks, the german-polish history textbook commission, ruling coalition immediately following world war ii, the allies instituted extensive education reforms in order to expunge nationalistic historical narra- tives from west german schools.2 despite allied educational reform, early west german history textbooks stressed the innocence and suffering of the german people rather than nazi aggression and atrocities. in the 1960s, however, german history textbooks were significantly revamped in order to better reflect nazi-era atrocities. these alterations were the result of governmental alarm over rising anti-semitic vandalism. nevertheless, by the late 1960s, german school textbooks still lacked coverage of poland and described the country with negative images. the 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed positive changes to the descriptions of poland and german-polish relations in german history textbooks. journal of educational media, memory, and society volume 2, issue 2, autumn 2010: 75–92 © gei doi: 10.3167/jemms.2010.020206 issn 2041-6938 (print), issn 2041-6946 (online) yangmo ku why did germany adopt conciliatory historical narratives and text- book policies regarding poland between the 1970s and 1980s when they had elected not to make such changes while making other significant edits in the 1960s? this article argues that the progressive ruling coalition of the social democratic party (spd) and the free democratic party (fdp) and brandt's ostpolitik paved the way for the emergence of the german-polish history textbook commission. from its inception, the textbook commission played a key role in causing the positive changes in ger- man history textbooks regarding poland through active history dialogues. conservative reaction against the textbook commission's activities rose in the mid-1970s yet rapidly declined in the early 1980s, failing to reverse such improvements in german school textbooks. in this article, the negative historical legacies between germany and poland are first outlined. following that, light is shed upon the impact of the progressive spd-fdp governing coalition and brandt's ostpolitik on the emergence of the textbook commission. the textbook commission and its activities are then examined as is the rise and fall of conservative reaction against its activism. finally, the changes in german historical narratives and textbook policies toward poland are discussed. historical background animosity between germany and poland dates back to the partition of poland by prussia, russia, and austria between 1772 and 1795. poles lived under colonial rule from then until the end of world war i when they regained national independence. during the colonial period, they lost "the right to use the polish language in public affairs and teach polish literature and history in schools, especially in prussian and russian held areas."3 under such circumstances, it was natural for the polish nation to harbor antagonistic feelings toward prussia/germany. hostile perceptions of germany reached their pinnacle following the nazi invasion and oc- cupation of poland between 1939 and 1945, which resulted in the death of over six million polish citizens.4 germans, on the other hand, came to harbor negative images of the poles upon witnessing the collapse of the polish aristocratic state at the end of eighteenth century, believing that poles were disorderly, inefficient, and extravagant.5 these unfavorable sentiments significantly worsened after millions of germans were expelled from prussia's eastern territory (the region east of the oder-neisse river) in the wake of world war ii. these mass expulsions were driven by the allies' assertion that "poland was deprived of half of its territory in the east and received extensive ger- man territory in the west as compensation."6 during the subsequent two

76 jemms the politics of historical memory in germany decades, poland strove to defend its newly established border, whereas the german federal republic did not recognize the oder-neisse border.7 the spd-fdp coalition government and its new ostpolitik the end of the spd's grand coalition with the christian democratic union (cdu) and the christian social union (csu) in 1969 marked a substantial political change in west germany. in its place, an spd-led coalition with the fdp arose and took control of the bundestag with willy brandt as the new german chancellor. the fdp's move to the left played a critical role in the establishment of this new coalition. as william griffith notes, this regime change was, to some extent, derived from "west german modernization, urbanization, and secularization, which strengthened its willing- ness to change and the belief that change could be effective."8 this change reflected the spd's gradual rise since 1959, when the party had begun to attract the middle class through strategies like "nationalization of industry and neutralization in foreign policy." the transfer of political power to the new spd-fdp coalition contributed to the adoption of a new policy toward the eastern bloc (so-called ostpolitik) that the spd had publicized from the 1960s. between 1966 and 1969, the grand cdu/csu and spd coalition promoted ostpolitik, but had failed to yield successful outcomes. the cdu/csu opposition prevented the grand coalition from making the minimal concessions— recognition of the oder-neisse line and east germany—that moscow requested.9 the spd-fdp coalition's ostpolitik differed, however, from the grand coalition's version in the following aspects. first, the brandt government elevated its new ostpolitik to the same priority level as west european unification and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato). second, the new coalition laid much weight on détente with the soviet union, east germany, and other east european countries. adopting such realistic policy priorities did not mean the abandonment of the coalition's ultimate goals of self-determination and reunification, but was rather a sign that they recognized that they could be accomplished only in the very long term.10 certainly, the east-west détente that significantly weakened inter- bloc confrontation between the two superpower rivals—the united states and the soviet union—constituted a favorable international environment for the brandt government to conduct a more open-minded and flexible type of ostpolitik.11

from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, both superpowers sought to diminish the risk of large-scale armed conflicts through negotiations and inter-bloc agreements including the may 1972 strategic arms limitation treaty (salt i).12 as thomas banchoff notes, autumn 2010 77 yangmo ku nato and warsaw pact states jointly established the conference on security and cooperation in europe (csce) and initiated mutual and bal- anced force reductions talks (mbfr). given these international détente efforts, the brandt government could safely seek to promote inter-germany contacts through a modus vivendi with the soviet union and its eastern european allies.

brandt's ostpolitik was rooted in both moral and political consid- erations. brandt preferred to openly confront germany's nazi past and supported both dialogue with israel and reparations in the early postwar period, though the spd played down the memory issue after its defeat in the 1949

elections.13 brandt also wished to address the atrocities of world war ii by restoring diplomatic relations with east european countries.14 as foreign minister for the grand coalition, brandt declared in 1968 that "bonn must respect and recognize the existing boundaries in europe, including the western boundary of poland (the oder-neisse line)."15 deeply cognizant of contemporary political and territorial circumstances, brandt recognized that "this status quo could not be changed through force or a policy of isolation."16 particularly striking in brandt's efforts to reconcile with poland was his kneeling before the monument to heroes of the warsaw ghetto in 1970.

according to krzysztof ruchniewicz, "chancellor brandt's visit to poland in december 1970 was expected to be a routine event: an official greeting at the airport, the laying of wreaths, the signing of the warsaw treaty, and holding political talks with gomulka. the visit was to end with a press conference."17 the unexpected, however, took place during brandt's ceremonial activities. as a gesture of contrition, brandt fell to his knees in front of the ghetto monument after laying a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier. brandt's ostpolitik still,

however, addressed the concerns of realpolitik. carole fink and bernd schaefer note: willy brandt's initiatives emerged from his frustration with the cold war stalemate in europe. with the erection of the berlin wall in 1961, germany's division was tightly sealed. brandt and his close adviser egon bahr recognized that the german problem would not be solved by the superpowers, who seemed content with the two-state-solution.<sup>18</sup> based on their recognition that this status quo was unlikely to be altered by other actors, brandt and bahr made their nation an active player capable of pursuing its own interests by creating a new approach to managing the cold war system. as the result of their new brand of ostpolitik, the spd-fdp coalition was able to sign bilateral treaties with moscow and warsaw in 1970 and ratify them in the bundestag two years later.<sup>19</sup> after concluding a basic treaty in late 1972, both germany's simultaneously became members of the united nations in september 1973. subsequently, the 78 jemms the politics of historical memory in germany brandt government established diplomatic relations with czechoslovakia, hungary, and bulgaria. the continuity of brandt's ostpolitik between 1969 and 1989 is notable, surviving despite the transition from a social-liberal to a conservative-liberal coalition government in 1982–83.<sup>20</sup> this power transfer led to a change of rhetoric, with new chancellor helmut kohl putting great emphasis on western integration and reunification. without significant deviation, however, the conservative coalition government actually continued to pursue the brandt era ostpolitik in its relations with east germany, eastern europe, and the soviet union. as timothy garton ash states: there is no break in the continuity of brandt's ostpolitik. as brandt laid it down, and schmidt played it in, so it is advanced by kohl. kohl himself also had declared: despite all the party-political disputes of the last decades, we may speak in this connection, with pride, of our policy.<sup>21</sup> the progressive spd-fdp ruling coalition and brandt's ostpolitik provided the favorable political environment necessary to the emergence of the german-polish history textbook commission and the important work it undertook from the early 1970s. the german-polish history textbook commission's activities the first attempt to initiate a history textbook dialogue dates back to the mid 1930s, when józef lipski, then polish ambassador to germany, proposed the creation of a german-polish common commission to address the anti-polish views prevalent in german textbooks.<sup>22</sup> despite germany's reluctance, the lipski proposal finally produced a series of meetings on german-polish history textbook issues in 1937 and 1938. although demonstrating the potential for revising both states' textbooks, the dialogues ended fruitlessly due to worsening political circumstances, including germany's annexation of austria. in the 1950s, enno meyer—a german high-school history teacher—made great efforts to restart the textbook dialogue and revise the insufficient, biased descriptions found in both german and polish history textbooks.<sup>23</sup> in march 1956, he issued a book with forty-seven themes criticizing aspects of both nations' textbooks (particularly germany's) with the support of exiled polish historians and the braunschweig-based georg eckert institute for international textbook research. meyer's critiques reaped positive responses from both german and polish historians. despite these efforts, however, hopes for a bilateral historians' dialogue were suddenly dampened by the warsaw pact's intervention of the hungary autumn 2010 79 yangmo ku garian revolution in november 1956, which then strained poland's relationship with the west.<sup>24</sup> the establishment of the german-polish history textbook commission in 1970 under the auspices of the united nations educational, scientific, and cultural organization (unesco) marked a significant turning point for the bilateral textbook dialogue.<sup>25</sup> as noted earlier, brandt's ostpolitik had laid the grounds for the launch of the textbook commission. the promulgation of the 1970 warsaw treaty that formally recognized the oder-neisse border, for example, went a long way towards quieting bilateral tension.<sup>26</sup> under these improved political circumstances, georg eckert—who had taken a leading part in the franco-german textbook dialogue in the 1950s—played a pivotal role in establishing the german-polish textbook commission.<sup>27</sup> the textbook commission was officially launched in february 1972 with a bilateral session in warsaw that initiated the history textbook dialogue. in accordance with the spirit of unesco, they agreed to participate in the dialogue to promote peace and mutual understanding. the german-polish history textbook commission was based on two principles. the first held that both german and polish views should be considered with balance when discussing all cases.<sup>28</sup> according to seun-gryol kim, historians from both countries who participated in the textbook commission analyzed how their national and relational history was described in their counterpart's textbooks. after presenting and comparing their research, the participants sought to find divergent historical interpretations and important but overlooked historical facts. not only did they strive to address factual errors, they also aimed to extract common historical interpretations. if they failed to reach consensus, however, they offered descriptions of different narratives simultaneously. the second foundational principle of the commission was its independence from governmental influence, particularly on the german side.<sup>29</sup> with political backing, west germany's foreign ministry provided the textbook commission with financial support for such activities as academic conferences and publications. keeping the government's influence in check, however, required that a chair of the german commission for unesco be solely in charge of holding the commission's scholarly workshops. afforded protection by the unesco umbrella, the textbook commission itself decided the themes, contents, and participants in the meetings, thus minimizing the impact of federal and local governments. members of the unesco commission themselves selected the chair in order to prevent the exertion of political pressure.<sup>30</sup> during the 1972–1975 textbook dialogue, the german-polish textbook commission at times witnessed tough, emotional discussions and nearly underwent a negotiations breakdown in its last phase.<sup>31</sup> one of the most controversial debates was over the concept of "expulsion" (ver-80 jemms the politics of historical memory in germany treibung). instead of that strongly evocative word, polish members of the textbook commission preferred the use of "forced moving" (zwangsaus-siedlung), "residents' transfer" (bevölkerungverschiebung), and "evacuation" (evakuierung).<sup>32</sup> all of the german members, on the other hand, insisted on using "expulsion," as the notion corresponded most closely to the past experiences of approximately ten million germans. this deadlock was ultimately resolved thanks to germany's unwillingly the process of "expulsion" would be divided into four stages: refuge (flucht), evacuation, forced moving, and migration. as robert maier posits, personal will and friendship between the commission leaders—eckert and markiewicz—played a key role in breaking this stalemate.<sup>33</sup> through these efforts, the textbook commission published the "recommendations on history and geography textbooks" (hereafter, recommendations) in april 1976, which were "uniform proposals for the authors of textbooks and history researchers in both countries."<sup>34</sup> to ensure the adoption and publication of the recommendations, german and polish historians held biannual scholarly meetings between 1972 and 1975 in warsaw and braunschweig alternately, discussing german-polish relations covered in their history and geography textbooks. as yinan he states: the recommendations included 26 topics ranging from the teutonic knights in the ancient history, to the three partitions of poland in the 18th century and the polish nation's struggle for independence, nazi occupation and polish resistance movement, and such contemporary events as the postwar territorial alterations, and migration of ethnic germans.<sup>35</sup> the cornerstone of the recommendations was the recognition of germany's past wrongs and the oder-neisse border.<sup>36</sup> the thirteenth clause of the recommendations, for example, articulated bismarck's oppressive policies toward poland, including the abolition of polish classes and the deportation of people without prussian nationality.<sup>37</sup> three of the recommendations' clauses (the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fourth), moreover, acknowledged the nazis' aggression and the oppression of poland. the twenty-fourth clause posited that hitler's oppression politics wrought far more serious damage in poland than in other occupied countries.<sup>38</sup> the twenty-first and twenty-sixth clauses also showed that germany and poland reached a mutually acceptable agreement over the oder-neisse border together on an equal footing. many of the recommendations' other clauses tried to ameliorate negative historical imagery of the poles.<sup>39</sup> for example, the seventh clause demanded active consideration of the polish culture's independent development and achievements.<sup>40</sup> the eighth clause expressed the excellence of the poles: "it should be emphasized that during the age of enlightenment, european culture. autumn 2010 81 yangmo ku for example, the knights school and the national education commission established in 1765 and 1773 respectively were pioneering works in europe."<sup>41</sup> the tenth clause also highlighted the poles' desire for independence and their untrammled spirit, stating, "after losing independence, the polish nation was not satisfied with the occupation of foreign powers. rather, they launched a campaign for freedom and independence."<sup>42</sup> despite their laudable contents, the usefulness of the recommendations was constrained by their elision of certain sensitive topics, including the secret protocol of the molotov-ribbentrop pact and the katyn massacre due to cold war constraints and polish mass pressure.<sup>43</sup> the german members of the textbook commission recognized that the pressure exerted by the soviet union limited the polish members. the polish government ordered its textbook commission members to be very cautious when dealing with these delicate issues.<sup>44</sup> due to these considerations for the soviet union, therefore, the textbook commission had to informally discuss such topics and exclude them from the recommendations completely. the textbook commission did, however, regard the recommendations as the foundation for future dialogue, rather than the final result of their work. thus, both sides decided to hold annual symposia in germany and poland at the ninth commission meeting in 1976. the main goal of the symposia was to provide teachers and textbook authors with more detailed information on the themes of the recommendations by introducing more in-depth research products.<sup>45</sup> following the scheme, historians from both nations gathered annually to deal with important periods and themes in the bilateral relationship. after each meeting, they published their research in both countries at the same time. while previous meetings had shown the two sides' strong desire to justify descriptions of their own national history, the subsequent symposia did not produce such phenomenon. this was possible, unsuk han has posited, because experts had been able to overcome national prejudices and build mutual understanding through active dialogue in the nine preceding meetings. a german member of the textbook commission also stated that both sides made it possible to reach significantly more similar historical narratives through their continued discussions in the 1980s.<sup>46</sup> the rise and decline of german conservative reaction the advent of the recommendations in the mid 1970s brought about very different responses in german and polish society. in poland, the recommendations only had a circulation of several thousand due to the authorities' opposition to a wider distribution.<sup>47</sup> additionally, there was no lively discussion or critique of the contents of the recommendations, as poland's civil society was not dynamic under the communist dictatorship.<sup>82</sup> jemms the politics of historical memory in germany of the period.<sup>48</sup> polish society's primary concern was largely limited to the extent to which west germany incorporated the recommendations into its school textbooks and classrooms.<sup>49</sup> in the german public sphere, on the other hand, controversial and persistent debates over the contents of the recommendations and their implementation took place in the 1970s.<sup>50</sup> among the active participants in these debates were the german bundestag (federal diet)/the landtags (state diets), high-ranking politicians, the league of history teachers, the education labor union, the society of textbook publication, and the association of expellees.<sup>51</sup> as jörg hoensch notes, members of the mass media, including broadcasting, national/local newspapers, and magazines, also covered the activities of the textbook commission, the contents of the recommendations, and the serious disputes surrounding these issues in great detail.<sup>52</sup> in the academic arena, moreover, many doctoral dissertations dealt with the educational concept of the recommendations, providing a historical background of the textbook commission's works. anti-communist conservatives in germany were the most significant source of the strong antagonism to the recommendations.<sup>53</sup> among the main opponents were the association of expellees, the conservative opposition cdu/csu, and nationalist newspapers such as deutsche-national zeitung. their chief critiques can be summarized in the following three points: (1) the german members of the textbook commission overlooked historical truth and excessively ceded ground to the polish national position; (2) the german members were not appropriate experts on eastern european issues; and (3) the recommendations trivialized the pain and sacrifice of expelled germans by using "transfer" instead of the concept of expulsion explicitly.<sup>54</sup> in contrast to the general media's support of the recommendations, deutsche-national zeitung sharply criticized german participants in the textbook dialogue, asserting that their work supported brandt's humiliating diplomatic overtures and sought to stamp out nationalism in german history textbooks.<sup>55</sup> according to hoensch, bayern-kurier, the newspaper of the csu party, described the recommendations as "distortion for the sake of amity." it went on to express that future german students ran the risk of studying a version of history based on the polish perspective. deutscher ostdienst, the association of expellees' newspaper, also articulated its concern that the history of german-polish relations was being distorted to the advantage of poland's nationalism. serious disputes also erupted in each landtag between the spd and the cdu/csu over the recommendations' implementation.<sup>56</sup> most cdu/csu members refused to adopt the recommendations because they thought that it would be improper for german historians without political responsibility to discuss and decide politically sensitive national issues such as the oder-neisse border problem.<sup>57</sup> cdu/csu-controlled länder autumn 2010 83 yangmo ku such as schleswig-holstein, bavaria, and baden-württemberg, which had a large proportion of refugees and expellees,<sup>58</sup> were opposed to the recommendations. on the other hand, länder ruled by the spd, including north rhine-westphalia, hamburg, bremen, hessen, and west berlin, supported the recommendations as the guidelines for textbook authorization and as a reference for classroom teaching.<sup>59</sup> the bavarian land, in particular, was strongly against the acceptance of the recommendations. in an article of the journal schule & wir, bavaria's education ministry declared it would not accept the recommendations for the following reasons.<sup>60</sup> first, the ministry asserted, the recommendations distorted the tremendous suffering and sacrifice the expelled germans experienced by changing expulsion (vertreibung) to transfer (verschiebung). second, the recommendations maintained silence about the negative impact of the soviet union on the hitler-stalin treaty and postwar territorial alterations. third, the recommendations hewed to the communist view by recognizing east germany as an independent state. it is important to note that the german conservatives' opposition to the recommendations constituted a part of their larger opposition to the spd-fdp coalition government's ostpolitik. a german researcher argues that because brandt's ostpolitik was ascendant in the early and mid-1970s, the opposition party cdu/csu aimed to regain its power by attacking the recommendations.<sup>61</sup> hoensch also raised the possibility that the association of expellees, which had been politically disaffected in the battle to create and implement the warsaw treaty, longed to restore lost territories and, at least, secure compensation by harshly criticizing the recommendations via a new battleground—textbook revision.<sup>62</sup> as the conservatives' attack reached its zenith, the expellee association published the alternative recommendations for the treatment of german-polish history in textbooks in 1978. the previous critiques placed much weight on the contemporary history included in the recommendations, yet these alternative recommendations—authored primarily by professor josef menzel of mainz university—covered much longer periods, striving to inspire a german nationalist perspective.<sup>63</sup> reaching back into the past as far as possible, the alternative recommendations dismissed the historical justifications for german claims over its former eastern regions.<sup>64</sup> in

interpreting german influence in eastern europe, menzel's report also highlighted the superiority of german culture in terms of politics, law, economics, and organizations that had greatly contributed to the civilization of the eastern areas. the alternative recommendations, furthermore, put great emphasis on the following points: (1) although the warsaw treaty recognized the oder-neisse border, its effect became diluted in the process of germany's domestic debates; (2) all germans who moved to west germany from the 84 jemms the politics of historical memory in germany eastern region of the oder-neisse border after world war ii were virtually expellees; (3) many human casualties took place during the expulsion process; (4) the role of russia or the soviet union was larger than that of germany in the partition of poland and the nazis' aggression toward poland; and (5) there were nazi sympathizers in poland.<sup>65</sup> the appearance of the conservatives' alternative recommendations attracted some public attention in the late 1970s. the expellee association and its supporters praised menzel's report as a usable alternative to the unacceptable recommendations produced by the textbook commission. the alternative recommendations, they also asserted, corrected a distorted version of history, thus helping to restore the historical truth.<sup>66</sup> as hoensch explains, this support was immediately reported in a variety of media, including *die welt*, *münchener merkur*, *mainzer allgemeine zeitung*, and *bayern-kurier*. particularly dr herbert hupka—a member of the bundestag and vice-chairman of the expellee association—strongly opposed the recommendations and worked tirelessly to spread menzel's report in the bundestag, academic forums, and the press.<sup>67</sup> the early 1980s, however, witnessed a significant weakening of the conservative campaign for the alternative recommendations on account of several factors. first, there was a positive change in the germans' view of the poles in the early 1980s. following the eruption of the solidarity movement in poland, the germans began to develop sympathetic attitudes toward the poles to the extent that even the cdu conservative party launched a campaign to help the poles.<sup>68</sup> the second was the kohle government's adoption of a conciliatory textbook policy. chancellor kohle's address in april 1985 played a pivotal role in neutralizing conservative attacks against the textbook commission and its recommendations. kohle stated that the textbook commission greatly contributed to promoting mutual understanding and reconciliation with germany's east european neighbors. kohle promised to fully support the activities of the textbook commission.<sup>69</sup> the third factor was the alternative recommendations' failure to deeply permeate german society, primarily because they were trite, and because people's perceptions had already begun to change thanks to the positive effect of the recommendations.<sup>70</sup> finally, as time went by, public concern over the textbook issues was weakening.<sup>71</sup> positive changes in german historical narratives and textbook policies after the late 1950s, west german history education underwent a momentous change to reflect greater coverage of past atrocities.<sup>72</sup> local and federal officials sought to address the inadequate treatment of nazism in school textbooks upon witnessing the rise of contemporary anti-semitic vandalism, including desecration of synagogues and jewish cemeteries. autumn 2010 85 yangmo ku to address this serious problem, educators and officials issued directives for political education to prevent the rise of neo-fascist youth organizations.<sup>73</sup> many schools sought to adopt the first west german textbook, the burden of guilt: a short history of germany, 1914–1945, that provided detailed and articulate descriptions of the nazi period. despite these notable changes, german school textbooks still lacked adequate coverage of poland and depicted germany's eastern neighbor with negative images until the end of the 1960s. according to włodzimierz borodziej, "german textbooks devoted very little space to poland. when they did say something about germany's eastern neighbor, they recalled the grievances suffered from the treaty of versailles to the expulsion of the german population from the former eastern lands after 1945."<sup>74</sup> seungryol kim confirms that coverage of poland in german history textbooks was very limited after world war ii, and what little information about poland that german school textbooks did incorporate remained negative.<sup>75</sup> under these circumstances, then, it is not surprising that ordinary german people held indifferent feelings toward poland. the 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed significant positive changes to the contents of german history textbooks, particularly their descriptions of poland and german-polish relations. a prominent example was the publication of the history textbook titled *die reise in die vergangenheit [trip to the past]* in 1972.<sup>76</sup> in its introduction, the textbook noted that the descriptions of german-polish relations in this text were based on the textbook commission's recommendations.<sup>77</sup> as zbigniew kulak notes, a teacher's manual that accompanied the textbook ascribed poland's three partitions to its weakness, but also maintained that the partition process carried out by poland's neighboring countries was violent and unjust. it also emphasized the necessity to overcome the historical bias toward western europe so prevalent in german history. the teacher's manual also quoted or cited the recommendations four times to supplement explanations in textbooks for students.<sup>78</sup> consequently, the textbook corresponded well to the spirit of the recommendations. the development of the recommendations in the 1970s played a key role in altering the content of german history textbooks. wolfgang jacobmeyer conceded that it would be hard to clearly demonstrate an exact causal nexus between the recommendations and text changes in school textbooks.<sup>79</sup> jacobmeyer posited, however, that the recommendations exerted great influence on textbook authors, examiners, and publishers, thereby helping to alter historical narratives in school textbooks. it was very important, ernst hinrichs explained, for west germany to accept the spirit of the recommendations in new editions of existing school textbooks as well as in newly published textbooks.<sup>80</sup> according to another researcher, the recommendations had a profound impact on german society in the sense that the german people in the 1960s were not familiar with the politics of historical memory in germany with germany's past maltreatment of the poles, but this fact became basic knowledge following the release of the recommendations. despite the absence of official länder guidelines, a number of schoolteachers freely read the recommendations and incorporated reflections from them in their history classes.<sup>81</sup> in 1982, the georg eckert institute evaluated thirteen editions of history textbooks used by different länder, concluding that "the coverage of poland reached the level of other major european countries such as france, and showed that the tendency was increasing. also, more than 90 percent of the changes in the textbook clearly suggested that west german textbook authors and publishers had incorporated the recommendations into textbook production."<sup>82</sup> at the policy level, the spd-fdp coalition government continued to support the textbook commission's activism and the revision of history textbooks in a conciliatory way, given the impetus of its ostpolitik. the federal government made sure that the recommendations were reflected in school textbooks when it came to signing a german-polish cultural agreement in 1976. even the transition from a social-liberal to a conservative-liberal coalition government in 1982–83 failed to prevent the textbook commission from making good on its goals. chancellor kohle, as noted earlier, promised to continue support for the commission's activities in 1985. on the state level, the spd-controlled länder continuously supported the recommendations, regarding them as guidelines for textbook authorization and as a key reference for classroom teaching. länder governed by the cdu/csu were initially opposed to the recommendations but began to express understanding of and respect for the efforts of the textbook commission in the late 1970s. as yinan he explains, a cdu-controlled land rheinland-pfalz distributed both the recommendations and menzel's report to all secondary schools in the state.<sup>83</sup> the state of saarland was willing to accept the spirit of the recommendations in his- tory education. even the government of bavaria, which had most harshly opposed the textbook cooperation, allowed the recommendations to be used in schools. conclusion this article sought to address how and why germany was able to employ conciliatory historical narratives and textbook policies toward poland between the 1970s and the 1980s. it claimed that, given the context of international détente efforts, the spd ascension and brandt's ostpolitik provided the favorable political environment in which the german-polish history textbook commission emerged in the early 1970s. under the auspices of the progressive spd-fdp ruling coalition, the textbook autumn 2010 87 yangmo ku commission played a pivotal role in promoting a reflective view of history and rectifying negative images of the poles in german school textbooks. additionally, conservative reaction was not powerful enough to overturn people's perceptions, which had already been changed by the recommendations. this analysis has implications for history textbook dialogues and adversarial reconciliation between former enemy states. my case study suggests that a joint textbook commission needs financial and political support from its governments, particularly from the perpetrator's side, in order to obtain successful outcomes. instead of government officials, however, professional historians should take the leading role in history dialogue because their academic integrity makes them relatively more impervious to the desire to make instrumental use of history.<sup>84</sup> in addition, textbook cooperation and historians' dialogue should be viewed as an effective means to resolve the issue of biased historical textbooks, as the german-polish history textbook commission demonstrates. successful history textbook dialogues can contribute to the achievement of historical reconciliation between enemy states by filling history perception gaps among the nations. acknowledgments i thank mike mochizuki, harvey feigenbaum, holger schmidt, unsuk han, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this 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2009. 58. i thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this fact. 59. he, "overcoming shadows of the past," 357. 60. han, kahaewa pihae ?i kubun ul neom?, 107. 61. personal interview, georg eckert institute, 11 may 2009. 62. hoensch, "seodok y?ron eso ?i dokil-poland kyokwas? kwonkoan e dae- han non?i," 158. 63. han, kahaewa pihae ?i kubun ul neom?, 107–108. 64. hoensch, "seodok y?ron eso ?i dokil-poland kyokwas? kwonkoan e dae- han non?i," 159. 65. kim, "du kae ?i sisun uro barabon minjoksa," 193–94. 66. hoensch, "seodok y?ron eso ?i dokil-poland kyokwas? kwonkoan e dae- han non?i," 159. 67. *ibid.*, 154–155; herbert hupka used to be in the spd before he switched to the cdu because of the spd's ostpolitik. 68. personal interview, georg eckert institute, 11 may 2009. 69. hoensch, "seodok y?ron eso ?i dokil-poland kyokwas? kwonkoan e dae- han non?i," 161–162. 70. personal interview, georg eckert institute, 11 may 2009. 71. personal interview, georg eckert institute, 6 may 2009. 72. lind, sorry states, 112–113: "early west german history education (shaped by allied educational reform) acknowledged nazi aggression and atrocities but emphasized the innocence and suffering of the german people. although the socialist opposition was arguing for more remembrance, the west german people preferred not to think about the victims of nazi terror. just as textbooks dodged contemporary history, west german historiography of this period minimized german guilt." 73. *ibid.*, 129–130. 74. borodziej, "co-operation in history textbook writing," 4: "in the federal republic, where there is no federal ministry of education and the schools are under the authority of the lands, there were numerous textbooks for each level of education and in each land." 77. zbgnew kulak, "seodok kwa poland sai ?i kyokwas? sujung ?i sungkwa mit munje dul [accomplishments and problems of textbook revision between germany and poland]," zum wissenschaftlichen ertrag der deutsch-polnischen schulbuchkonferenzen der historiker 1972–1987, wolfgang jacobmeyer, ed., trans. seungryol kim (braunschweig: georg eckert institute, 1989), 68. 78. kulak, "seodok kwa poland sai ?i kyokwas? sujung ?i sungkwa mit munje dul," 66. autumn 2010 91 yangmo ku 79. wolfgang jacobmeyer, "1976 ny?n dokil-poland kwonkoan balpyo ihu dokil y?ksa kyokwas? ?i sujung [revision of german history textbooks after the 1976 german-polish recommendations]," in zum wissenschaftlichen ertrag der deutsch-polnischen schulbuchkonferenzen der historiker 1972–1987, wolfgang ja- cobmeyer, ed., trans. seungryol kim (braunschweig: georg eckert institute, 1989), 1. 80. ernst hinrichs, "s?mun [introduction]" in zum wissenschaftlichen ertrag der deutsch-polnischen schulbuchkonferenzen der historiker 1972–1987, wolfgang ja- cobmeyer, ed., trans. seungryol kim (braunschweig: georg eckert institute, 1989), iii. 81. personal interview, georg eckert institute, 11 may 2009. 82. he, "overcoming shadows of the past," 358. 83. *ibid.*, 357–358. 84. *ibid.*, 424–425. 92 jemms related papers dealing with historical issues in japan and germany: ruling coalitions, transnational activism, and conservative reaction by yangmo kugermany's foreign policy towards poland and the czech republic by stefan wolff the german question in central and eastern europe and the long peace in europe after 1945: an integrated theoretical explanation by jonathan ryncholdenno meyer. a pioneer of reconciliation by krzysztof ruchniewicz the establishment of bulgarian–west german diplomatic relations within the coordinating framework of the warsaw pact by jordan baevdownload pdf

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the ostpolitik of the early federal republic presents a puzzle: why did west germany—a country that consistently denounced the brutal eastern policies of the third reich and sought to present itself as a new, peace-loving entity—refuse to normalize its relations with most east european countries until the early 1970s? the existing literature has explained bonn's behavior primarily with reference to foreign policy calculations, such as the need to isolate the gdr and its satellite allies and to avoid granting unilateral concessions to the soviet bloc. although such staatsräson considerations were very significant for the federal republic's policymakers, they do not tell the whole story. movement on eastern policy was also significantly hindered by domestic factors, the most important of which was the influence of the vertriebenenverbände—the pressure organizations purporting to represent the millions of germans expelled from eastern europe in the aftermath of world war ii. the role of these organizations has typically received passing reference in general studies of ostpolitik, but the specialized literature on the topic has remained weak.

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